

Fairness between the Parties:

A Suggestion about How to Think About It

One of the most useless, unedifying discussions I've ever run across appears in the transcription of the redistricting commission meeting on December 12, 1991. The topic was whether particular districts were Republican or Democratic.

The uselessness of the discussion was made vividly clear, some days later, by the responses to a request from a member of the public, Chris Jackins, of Seattle. On December 30, 1991, he spoke as follows:

Hello again. My name is Chris Jackins, as you know. I have a question for you, I guess the same question I've asked a couple of other times.

Again in this data, I don't see anything that tells me what the political breakup is. And you have said, in your comments, that this [referring to the final legislative plan] gives you a much fairer and competitive situation. Are you going to put out that information? Because I've asked a number of times about the other plans. And I presume, since you know it's more fair and more competitive, that you have access to that data. So I'd still be curious to see it.

One of the commissioners, Bill Polk, responded, as follows:

The reason we don't put it out is we don't really have any agreement between ourselves on what the numbers are. Veda and I, actually we even tend to use different numbers to evaluate it, and we use different numbers from what Shelly and Mary Kay use. And so we each individually have to come to our own conclusions about whether these are well-balanced or not. So there isn't an objective measurement that we can offer to you, to answer your question.

Other commissioners also spoke to this question. Here's part of the response of Veda Jellen:

When we first started this process, we had some discussion, among the Commissioners, about whether we should begin our negotiations by defining how many districts would be what percent Republican and Democrat in order to achieve balance And that was when we ran across one of our first disagreements, in that we couldn't agree on what data ought to be used And so it became a very subjective thing, so subjective that we finally decided that we would simply draw lines based on population and communities of interest, and each one of us would have to evaluate those ourselves as to whether or not we felt that they were competitive districts. And that's what we've done.

I don't believe that the approach used by 1991 commissioners was an appropriate one. It did not provide a basis upon which they could respond to a legitimate public request for some kind of objective response to a reasonable inquiry about compliance with constitutional requirements.

I think the 2011 commission can do better. It must do better.

I would like to outline some means by which it can do better.

I believe that the place to start is to acknowledge that the commission has an obligation under the state constitution, first, to “encourage electoral competition” which, to me, means to increase competitiveness of districts in those cases in which it is possible and, second, not “purposely to favor or discriminate against any political party or group.”

Unfortunately, the data with which you have to deal complicates the quest to satisfy these constitutional directives.

Republicans are more advantageously spread through the voting population of the state than are Democrats. This causes great difficulty in creating any kind of plan which is actually balanced between the parties.

I have examined the election results in each of the 21 contested statewide races during the last decade and the number of legislative districts won by each of those candidates.

What I found was that at any particular percentage of the two-party statewide vote, the Republican candidate generally won more legislative districts than a Democratic candidate. For example, in the contest for governor in 2004, both candidates received 50% of the statewide vote. Yet Dino Rossi won 30 districts and Chris Gregoire won only 19. In the contest of land commissioner in 2008, Goldmark received about 50 and a half percent of the vote, but won only 21 districts. Sutherland, his losing Republican opponent, won 28 districts.

Sam Reed won 42 districts in 2008 with 58.33% of the two party vote, but three Democratic candidates in three different years, Owen, Cantwell and Obama, with a larger share of the vote than Reed received, won only 39 districts. And Kreidler in 2008 with 61.38% of the two-party vote, three percentage points more than Reed, was only able to win 40 districts.

No Republican candidate who won the state, won fewer than 31 legislative districts. The two Democratic candidates who won the state by the narrowest margins won only 21 legislative districts. This difference of ten districts accords closely to the eleven district disparity between Rossi and Gregoire.

In every case, when two candidates won the same number of districts, the Democratic candidate had a higher percentage of the two-party vote. The details I have given may be examined in table 1.

This pattern suggests that the distribution of Republican votes among the 49 legislative districts is an advantage to the Republicans.

The question this raises is whether this is natural or artificial. I believe that it is mostly natural. That is to say, I don't believe that the 2001 redistricting commission packed Democrats and advantageously dispersed Republicans, either knowingly or inadvertently.

To test this idea that Democrats are more concentrated in the state than are Republicans, I examined the total votes, by legislative district, for the eleven statewide Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2006-2010 elections. I computed the total populations and the total Democratic and Republican votes for the seven most Democratic districts and the seven most Republican districts in each contest.

In every case, the seven most Republican districts had a larger share of the state's population than the seven most Democratic districts, by around 10%. However, in nine of the eleven cases, the Democratic candidate received a higher percentage of his statewide vote in the seven most Democratic districts than did the Republican candidate in the seven most Republican districts. And in the two cases which were exceptions, the contests for lieutenant governor and auditor, the disparity between the percentages of vote received were less than the disparity in the populations of the two groups of districts. To give an example, in the contest for land commissioner, the Democratic candidate received 21% of his votes in the seven most Democratic districts which had less than 14% of the state's population. The Republican candidate received only 17% of his votes in the seven most Republican districts, even though they had more than 14% of the state's population. The details are shown in table 2.

If the seven most Democratic districts were distributed through the state, it would appear that packing of Democrats had been done. However, this is not the case. All six Seattle districts were among the seven most Democratic in all eleven cases, except that LD 11 was not in the contest for attorney general. The seventh district in the group varied by contest, but four times it was district 32, Shoreline, which abuts Seattle. There isn't any reasonable way to unpack Seattle to distribute the Democrats there among other districts.

The same thing is true on the Republican side. With the exception of the occasional appearance of district 18 or district 20, all of the seven most Republican districts were in eastern Washington. So, it's not as if there is any reasonable way to pack Republicans there to match the Democratic packing in Seattle.

I also looked at how many districts provided each candidate a higher share of the vote than the candidate received in the state. The average result was that 22 districts were more Democratic than the state and 27 districts were more Republican than the state. The only case in which the number of districts more Democratic exceeded the number more Republican than the state was the contest for lieutenant governor. The details of this may also be seen in table 2, shown by the solid black lines near the center of the table which separate the districts more Democratic than the state, above the line, from the districts more Republican than the state, below the line.

So, I conclude that the current districts reflect a noticeable bias toward the Republicans, due to the natural distribution of the voters of the two parties, rather than as the result of some Republican success in skewing the 2001 redistricting. This bias toward the Republicans in the distribution of voters throughout the state makes it more difficult to prepare a redistricting plan which gives each party an equal opportunity to win when the voters are equally divided. I expect that when the voters are equally divided between the parties, the Republicans are likely to win a majority in the legislature.

As if this were not enough, it is clear that the commission must replace one existing district which is more Democratic than the state with a district which is more Republican than the state. I have described each district by its propensity toward divergence from the state two-party result in any contest. I divided the districts into three groups, the 22 districts most likely to vote Democratic, currently represented in the legislature by 64 Democrats and 2 Republicans, the 22 districts most likely to vote Republican, currently represented in the legislature by 58 Republicans and 8 Democrats, and the remaining five districts, currently represented in the legislature by 11 Democrats and 4 Republicans. When I accumulated the populations of the first two groups, I found that the Republican-leaning group of 22 districts had population sufficient for 23 districts, and the Democratic-leaning

group of 22 districts had population sufficient for only 21 districts. The details are in table 3.

I next looked at the numbers of persons in the state represented by Democrats and Republicans in the legislature. For the Senate, 27 Democrats represent an aggregate of 3,588,470 persons, or 132,906 persons per Democratic senator. 22 Republicans represent an aggregate of 3,136,070 persons, or 142,549 persons per Republican senator. When these aggregate numbers are divided by the ideal population for a legislative district, the results indicate that the 27 Democrats represent a population large enough for 26 districts and the 22 Republicans, 23.

For the House, the results are similar. Splitting the population in half between the parties for those districts represented by a Democrat and a Republican, I find that 56 Democrats represent 3,712,119 persons, or 66,288 per Democratic representative. The 42 Republicans represent 3,012,421 persons, or 71,724 per Republican representative. Again, dividing these population totals by the ideal population for a legislative district, the results indicate that the 56 Democrats represent a population large enough for 27 districts, or 54 house seats, and the 42 Republicans, 22 districts, or 44 house seats.

Although this information standing alone would not be sufficient to establish that one district more Democratic than the state must be replaced by a district more Republican than the state, it is fully consistent with the conclusion drawn from the information previously presented showing the same thing. The details are in table 4.

One can imagine that a Democratic response to the disparate dispersion of the voters for the two parties among the state's population might be to try to pack Republicans into heavily Republican districts to try to match the Democratic majority in the Seattle districts. Fortunately for everyone, this can't be done under the constitution which calls for districts to be compact, convenient and contiguous while dividing as few counties and municipalities as possible.

The better solution is this: Create the maximum number of competitive districts. While there are areas of the state in which it is difficult to do this, even without the limitations contained in the constitution, the fact is that there are very few districts in the state which cannot be won by a strong candidate of either party. Note that in the 21 statewide contests during the last decade, over half of the winning candidates, nine Democrats and three Republicans, won at least 37 districts. One Democratic candidate won 48 of the 49 districts. One Republican candidate won 42 districts

The thing that is most fortunate about this solution to the Democrats disadvantage is that it is exactly what the state constitution requires.

So, how should competitiveness be evaluated?

Here's how I evaluate it. I never try to decide if an existing or proposed district is Republican or Democratic, leaning or safe. I simply look at the relationship between the past vote in the existing districts and in the proposed districts to determine whether the proposed districts vote more similarly to the state than did the existing districts. If so, I believe that the proposed plan is compliant with the constitutional requirement to "encourage electoral competition".

And I should say something about competitiveness. The crucial circumstance for competitiveness is that point at which the voters of the state are equally divided in their preference for a legislature under Republican or Democratic control. The best districting plan is the one which most ensures that the point at which the legislature is balanced between the parties is the same point at which

the voters are equally divided. The most fair redistricting plan, in this respect, is one in which the midpoint district, the 25th most Republican and 25th most Democratic district votes very similarly to the state. In terms of the descriptors I used in table 3, this would be a 0 district, neither +xR nor +xD. But, given the greater concentration of Democratic voters in the state, this is not easily accomplished.

By maximizing the number of districts which vote the same as the state, we will both maximize the opportunity for the voters' preference to be actually reflected in the legislature and afford the Democrats the best opportunity to overcome the disadvantage arising from the concentration of their voters.

Table 1

Legislative Districts Won by Statewide Candidates

Office	D candidate	D%	Won	R%	R candidate	Office
Aud 2004	Sonntag	66.47	48			
Treas 2004	Murphy	62.59	45			
Aud 2008	Sonntag	63.54	44			
LtGov 2008	Owen	60.80	44			
			42	58.33	Reed	SoS 2008
Ins 2008	Kreidler	61.38	40			
			40	59.13	McKenna	AG 2008
Pres 2008	Obama	58.75	39			
Sen 2006	Cantwell	58.74	39			
LtGov 2004	Owen	58.60	39			
Sen 2004	Murray	56.27	37			
			37	55.05	McKenna	AG 2004
Ins 2004	Kreidler	56.83	35			
			33	53.10	Reed	SoS 2004
Pres 2004	Kerry	53.65	31	51.70	Sutherland	CPL 2004
			30			
			30	50.00	Rossi	Gov 2004
			28	49.45	Sutherland	CPL 2008
			28	48.92	Martin	Treas 2008
Gov 2006	Gregoire	53.24	26			
Sen 2010	Murray	52.36	25			
			24	47.64	Rossi	Sen 2010
			23	46.76	Rossi	Gov 2008
Treas 2008	McIntire	51.08	21			
CPL 2008	Goldmark	50.55	21			
Gov 2004	Gregoire	50.00	19			
			19	46.35	Bush	Pres 2004
CPL 2004	Cooper	48.30	18			
SoS 2004	Ruderman	46.90	16			
			14	43.17	Adams	Ins 2004
AG 2004	Senn	44.95	12			
			12	43.73	Nethercutt	Sen 2004
			10	41.40	Wiest	LtGov 2004
			10	41.26	McGavick	Sen 2006
			10	41.25	McCain	Pres 2008
AG 2008	Ladenburg	40.54	9			
			9	38.62	Adams	Ins 2008
SoS 2008	Osgood	41.67	7			
			5	39.20	McCraw	LtGov 2008
			5	36.46	McEntee	Aud 2008
			4	37.41	Lewis	Treas 2004
			1	33.53	Baker	Aud 2004

Revised by John Milem
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Table 2

Most D to Most R Legislative Districts in Eleven Statewide Contests

	2010 Pop	Cantwell	McGavick	D%	2010 Pop	Obama	McCain	D%	2010 Pop	Gregoire	Ross	D%	2010 Pop	Owen	McCraw	D%			
43	133,976	41,461	5,764	87.80	43	133,976	66,850	7,218	43	133,976	62,637	11,187	84.84	37	127,546	40,430	9,954	80.24	
37	127,546	28,310	4,312	66.78	37	127,546	47,595	6,947	37	127,546	45,242	8,054	83.32	46	127,849	48,746	16,114	75.53	
36	133,901	45,388	9,551	82.62	36	133,901	68,297	12,043	36	133,901	62,747	17,413	78.28	43	133,976	50,531	17,061	74.76	
46	127,849	41,453	9,498	81.36	46	127,849	60,405	11,636	46	127,849	55,948	16,048	77.71	36	133,901	54,402	19,085	74.02	
34	125,055	34,763	10,361	77.05	34	125,055	51,115	13,696	34	125,055	47,375	17,560	72.97	34	125,055	44,303	15,735	73.79	
11	134,027	17,441	7,741	70.86	11	134,027	32,157	12,963	11	134,027	29,677	14,938	66.52	11	134,027	29,567	11,676	71.69	
27	123,557	22,802	10,205	69.18	27	123,557	42,704	18,923	27	123,557	43,022	24,388	63.81	22	141,695	48,433	19,805	70.98	
32	122,038	32,467	15,120	68.24	32	122,038	35,090	15,374	32	122,038	32,466	16,762	63.38	22	123,557	34,011	14,540	70.05	
29	127,259	14,548	7,095	67.25	29	127,259	47,150	24,165	29	127,259	45,542	26,462	63.25	32	122,038	43,396	19,073	69.47	
22	141,695	30,288	15,514	66.13	22	141,695	24,318	12,696	22	141,695	22,942	14,514	61.25	32	122,038	24,616	11,179	68.77	
3	120,601	18,528	10,431	63.98	3	120,601	20,358	10,350	3	120,601	26,771	18,127	59.63	33	129,246	28,063	14,027	66.67	
21	133,156	24,012	13,743	63.60	21	133,156	38,133	20,358	21	133,156	36,883	26,711	59.53	33	129,246	28,315	14,709	65.81	
38	129,246	18,287	11,236	63.19	38	129,246	29,092	15,860	38	129,246	28,406	28,406	58.06	2	133,156	36,540	19,145	65.82	
33	129,246	18,209	10,855	62.65	33	129,246	20,343	6,445	33	129,246	26,605	18,588	58.06	3	133,156	36,540	19,145	65.82	
49	134,779	20,564	12,616	61.98	49	134,779	46,359	25,575	49	134,779	34,163	24,562	58.14	35	138,142	41,306	22,352	64.89	
40	138,142	18,677	11,871	61.83	40	138,142	44,607	25,052	40	138,142	30,443	22,745	58.14	35	138,142	41,306	22,352	64.89	
18	128,904	23,556	15,122	60.90	18	128,904	30,202	17,923	18	128,904	27,987	21,105	56.83	40	138,925	30,242	16,575	64.60	
23	130,119	28,828	19,151	60.90	23	130,119	42,174	25,502	23	130,119	38,871	32,133	55.37	19	128,904	33,177	18,541	64.15	
41	142,722	31,472	20,345	60.74	41	142,722	42,174	25,502	41	142,722	38,871	32,133	55.37	24	132,679	44,164	24,774	64.08	
1	147,265	25,742	16,890	60.38	1	147,265	27,335	16,826	1	147,265	36,981	31,116	54.31	1	147,265	40,268	23,710	62.94	
48	130,423	24,562	16,607	59.66	48	130,423	32,106	20,632	48	130,423	36,981	31,116	54.31	23	130,119	40,479	24,259	62.53	
30	129,988	18,122	12,612	58.96	30	129,988	28,124	19,457	30	129,988	39,195	33,046	54.26	49	134,779	31,742	16,779	62.83	
24	132,679	37,054	23,053	58.17	24	132,679	40,188	27,084	24	132,679	36,635	31,115	54.07	23	130,119	40,479	24,259	62.53	
28	119,484	19,819	14,500	57.87	28	119,484	33,187	58,32	28	119,484	25,906	22,922	55.06	41	142,722	40,785	24,593	62.38	
45	136,432	27,480	20,026	57.85	45	136,432	31,056	22,448	45	136,432	27,046	23,885	55.00	30	129,988	28,274	17,056	62.24	
35	138,142	26,503	20,177	56.78	35	138,142	40,642	30,333	35	138,142	36,284	34,793	60.72	48	130,423	32,562	19,756	62.24	
44	156,489	24,928	19,967	55.53	44	156,489	40,730	30,714	44	156,489	35,807	34,793	60.72	28	119,484	29,700	18,379	61.14	
5	161,403	29,291	23,843	55.13	5	161,403	32,121	24,547	5	161,403	28,671	26,841	50.70	45	136,432	39,337	25,565	60.16	
47	140,146	29,291	23,843	55.13	47	140,146	28,773	22,173	47	140,146	28,571	26,871	48.80	47	140,146	31,518	21,165	59.83	
25	145,035	29,291	23,843	55.13	25	145,035	35,134	29,988	25	145,035	36,556	36,855	48.32	44	156,489	40,328	28,026	59.00	
10	134,117	26,813	16,890	54.42	10	134,117	32,142	28,836	10	134,117	32,518	33,549	48.22	5	161,403	41,892	30,784	57.52	
39	143,154	22,216	18,890	54.05	39	143,154	33,526	29,950	39	143,154	36,254	48,76	48.76	25	145,035	33,455	24,720	57.50	
42	146,619	25,608	21,818	54.00	42	146,619	39,388	31,532	42	146,619	38,556	48,31	48.31	26	133,755	36,046	26,904	57.26	
26	133,755	25,608	21,818	54.00	26	133,755	33,526	29,950	26	133,755	36,254	48,76	48.76	38	143,154	34,793	26,622	56.53	
46	146,619	25,608	21,818	54.00	46	146,619	39,388	31,532	46	146,619	38,556	48,31	48.31	42	146,619	37,979	29,189	56.53	
31	150,727	19,307	17,116	53.01	31	150,727	36,982	33,215	31	150,727	28,251	30,847	48.67	15	132,788	22,170	17,152	56.38	
6	141,123	27,734	25,705	51.90	6	141,123	34,039	31,230	6	141,123	29,170	32,186	47.54	16	132,788	22,170	17,152	56.38	
2	163,707	20,055	18,847	51.90	2	163,707	20,055	18,847	2	163,707	20,055	18,847	45.31	20	141,029	35,323	27,559	56.17	
15	132,788	14,474	13,817	51.16	15	132,788	20,622	20,064	15	132,788	18,622	22,481	46.31	6	141,123	30,773	30,898	56.28	
18	160,083	23,762	24,323	49.42	18	160,083	31,488	32,927	18	160,083	36,424	45,07	45.07	31	137,685	31,375	24,803	56.05	
9	136,166	18,356	20,611	47.11	9	136,166	35,646	39,448	9	136,166	28,245	38,434	42.36	2	163,707	35,636	28,427	54.20	
20	141,029	21,217	23,991	46.93	20	141,029	30,407	35,188	20	141,029	31,757	43,249	42.34	14	130,478	23,138	20,732	52.74	
4	141,254	21,488	24,522	46.70	4	141,254	23,560	29,876	4	141,254	22,822	31,118	42.34	18	136,166	25,692	25,174	50.51	
16	154,830	16,956	19,674	46.14	16	154,830	28,238	31,192	16	154,830	28,173	38,478	42.27	18	136,166	25,692	25,174	50.51	
14	130,478	14,478	17,614	44.83	14	130,478	28,238	31,192	14	130,478	28,173	38,478	42.27	4	141,254	31,896	31,824	50.13	
8	149,474	18,219	23,561	43.82	8	149,474	18,666	25,628	8	149,474	17,555	28,410	36.19	4	141,254	31,896	31,824	50.13	
7	130,475	18,503	25,283	43.55	7	130,475	20,864	32,204	7	130,475	21,302	34,936	37.88	16	154,830	24,988	25,976	49.03	
12	132,531	17,292	25,089	42.81	12	132,531	23,481	36,310	12	132,531	22,105	38,992	36.18	12	132,531	25,379	27,416	48.07	
13	143,750	14,615	21,290	40.70	13	143,750	19,865	31,243	13	143,750	18,740	34,989	34.87	13	143,750	22,936	26,402	46.49	
6,724,540	1,184,659	832,106	58.74	6,724,540	1,750,848	1,229,216	58.75	6,724,540	1,598,738	1,404,124	53.24	6,724,540	1,716,033	1,107,634	60.80	6,724,540	1,716,033	1,107,634	60.80
Totals	2010 Pop	Cantwell	McGavick	D%	2010 Pop	Obama	McCain	D%	2010 Pop	Gregoire	Ross	D%	2010 Pop	Owen	McCraw	D%			
7 most D	906,211	233,060	57,422	13.46%	904,392	374,123	83,426	21.37%	904,392	346,638	110,589	21.68%	904,392	317,412	109,440	13.74%			
7 most R	982,782	122,451	155,043	10.34%	982,782	159,511	232,168	16.23%	982,567	144,629	253,195	15.03%	1,012,397	195,383	209,750	11.37%			
Percentages																			
7 most D	13.46%	18.67%	6.90%	10.34%	13.45%	21.37%	6.79%	13.45%	21.68%	7.86%	13.45%	21.68%	13.74%	18.48%	9.86%	11.37%			
7 most R	14.62%	10.34%	18.63%	10.34%	14.62%	9.11%	18.89%	14.61%	9.05%	16.03%	14.61%	9.05%	15.06%	11.37%	18.94%	11.37%			

Table 2

Most D to Most R Legislative Districts in Eleven Statewide Contests

	2010 Pop	Osgood	Reed	D%	2010 Pop	McIntire	Martin	D%	2010 Pop	Sonntag	McEntee	D%	2010 Pop	Ladenburg	McKenna	D%	
37	127,546	16,689	68.73	78.90	43	133,976	38,962	78.90	43	133,976	58,477	77.98	37	127,546	34,000	68.39	
43	133,976	43,436	63.88	14,753	43	133,976	51,761	14,753	43	133,976	43,485	6.031	43	133,976	45,707	21,072	
36	133,901	42,658	58.07	15,196	36	133,901	46,222	15,196	36	133,901	46,222	10,340	46	133,901	43,301	21,175	
11	134,027	22,667	55.25	20,234	46	127,849	46,222	20,234	46	127,849	60,779	11,596	36	133,901	36,839	29,793	
46	127,849	36,138	29,762	54.84	34	125,055	39,056	20,007	34	125,055	47,543	11,457	34	125,055	32,897	27,731	
34	125,055	32,808	27,098	54.77	11	134,027	25,971	14,420	11	134,027	30,542	9,966	28	127,259	19,100	16,945	
29	127,259	18,882	52.31	13,433	27	123,857	36,139	12,246	27	123,857	36,139	74.72	27	123,857	25,732	23,200	
3	120,601	21,363	49.42	16,762	32	122,038	35,233	15,879	32	122,038	35,233	74.14	11	134,027	21,655	19,935	
49	134,779	24,838	25,420	49.42	27	123,857	27,220	16,713	27	123,857	27,220	8.958	49	134,779	25,686	24,377	
27	123,857	22,670	47.38	21,918	49	134,779	26,529	21,918	49	134,779	26,529	72.13	18	126,904	24,385	26,637	
38	129,624	22,103	47.25	24,680	32	122,038	34,815	26,649	33	129,246	29,018	12,393	18	126,904	24,385	26,637	
19	126,904	24,206	46.99	27,304	33	129,246	34,815	26,649	33	129,246	29,018	12,393	3	120,601	20,044	22,816	
33	129,246	19,592	46.72	28,671	41	147,265	36,181	28,671	41	147,265	42,044	68.62	40	138,925	28,768	36,405	
21	133,156	25,396	45.95	28,925	33	129,246	36,181	28,671	33	129,246	43,137	20,673	33	129,246	18,590	23,969	
32	122,038	28,345	34,016	45.45	38	129,624	25,744	20,657	38	129,624	43,137	15,291	17	100,727	24,741	32,333	
40	138,925	29,955	35,992	45.45	21	133,156	29,968	25,194	48	130,433	34,201	16,789	32	122,038	27,395	35,832	
17	150,727	24,792	32,478	43.28	22	141,695	36,987	30,489	48	130,433	34,201	16,789	32	122,038	27,395	35,832	
1	147,265	27,585	36,386	43.12	28	119,494	34,991	32,317	1	147,265	42,044	21,306	66.37	38	119,494	20,310	26,729
15	132,768	18,276	22,598	42.60	23	130,119	33,035	30,896	23	130,119	32,154	16,400	28	119,494	20,310	26,729	
30	129,998	19,236	25,949	42.57	30	129,998	28,810	21,663	30	129,998	29,534	15,176	15	132,768	16,337	22,919	
24	132,678	29,018	39,232	42.52	1	147,265	32,737	31,258	3	120,601	27,738	14,312	24	132,678	28,319	41,462	
42	146,619	27,614	39,402	41.21	45	136,432	40,329	22,217	45	136,432	40,329	65.96	22	141,695	28,660	38,374	
44	156,489	27,512	40,841	40.25	15	132,768	19,223	19,766	15	132,768	18,167	15,167	22	141,695	27,745	40,792	
39	143,154	24,614	36,805	40.08	17	150,727	27,754	29,213	17	150,727	40,791	23,363	30	129,998	18,517	27,417	
47	140,146	20,873	39,644	39.64	35	136,142	30,271	32,059	48	134,779	31,853	65.56	18	160,083	26,873	40,140	
45	136,432	24,678	39,298	39.57	41	142,722	30,828	33,137	48	134,779	31,853	65.56	18	160,083	26,873	40,140	
48	140,423	20,015	32,118	39.39	48	130,423	24,688	26,614	48	130,423	24,688	62.66	25	145,035	22,439	36,324	
25	145,035	22,017	35,747	38.12	47	140,146	24,688	26,614	24	132,678	41,849	25,265	25	145,035	22,439	36,324	
18	160,083	27,062	43,988	38.09	44	156,489	32,251	35,508	47	161,403	43,624	27,357	26	145,035	22,439	36,324	
41	142,722	24,392	40,873	37.37	25	145,035	27,012	32,028	47	161,403	43,624	27,357	35	133,755	24,204	39,274	
28	119,494	17,967	30,214	37.29	39	143,154	26,635	32,301	26	133,755	37,840	24,738	44	156,489	24,980	44,324	
35	133,755	23,436	39,810	37.06	6	141,123	32,038	36,987	46	142,722	37,840	24,738	38	143,154	22,069	39,002	
28	133,755	22,972	39,506	36.77	2	163,707	28,197	32,821	46	142,722	37,840	24,738	48	130,423	18,954	34,187	
31	137,685	20,438	35,368	36.61	45	136,432	29,003	33,937	46	142,722	37,840	24,738	47	140,146	18,902	34,630	
6	161,403	26,024	46,366	35.95	26	133,755	27,846	33,998	45	136,432	29,003	33,937	47	140,146	18,902	34,630	
8	141,123	24,989	45,770	35.32	31	137,685	24,537	30,419	45	136,432	29,003	33,937	47	140,146	18,902	34,630	
22	141,695	24,166	44,608	35.14	5	181,403	31,328	39,822	44	132,768	17,280	17,280	45	136,432	22,766	42,240	
4	141,254	21,709	42,191	33.97	18	160,083	30,981	39,595	43	130,423	31,062	25,880	41	142,722	22,513	37,413	
14	130,478	17,002	33,999	33.34	14	130,478	18,592	24,622	17	150,727	31,062	25,880	41	142,722	22,513	37,413	
7	130,478	14,303	28,653	32.53	20	141,029	26,207	35,625	14	130,478	22,244	20,926	5	161,403	24,012	50,044	
12	132,678	18,755	39,028	32.46	4	141,254	26,437	35,133	12	132,678	22,244	20,926	9	136,166	16,427	34,520	
7	130,475	16,740	36,350	31.53	9	136,166	20,483	29,645	9	136,166	25,736	25,736	12	132,678	16,437	36,722	
20	141,029	19,958	43,508	31.45	4	141,254	20,483	29,645	9	136,166	25,736	25,736	20	141,029	19,568	43,846	
13	143,750	15,322	34,162	30.86	16	154,830	19,072	31,257	4	141,254	30,891	31,654	16	154,830	15,286	35,595	
16	154,830	15,625	35,364	30.64	13	143,750	16,417	30,319	16	154,830	24,244	26,006	16	154,830	17,405	40,621	
5	149,474	16,423	42,581	27.83	13	143,750	16,417	30,319	13	143,750	22,664	25,815	14	130,478	12,626	31,687	
8	149,474	16,423	42,581	27.83	7	130,475	26,299	30,707	7	130,475	26,299	30,707	13	143,750	13,855	35,526	
6,724,540	1,175,086	1,644,597	41.67	1,360,063	6,724,540	1,420,022	1,360,063	51.08	6,724,540	1,770,977	1,016,396	63.54	6,724,540	1,152,174	1,689,764	40.54	
6,724,540	1,175,086	1,644,597	41.67	1,360,063	6,724,540	1,420,022	1,360,063	51.08	6,724,540	1,770,977	1,016,396	63.54	6,724,540	1,152,174	1,689,764	40.54	
2010 Pop	Osgood	Reed	D%	2010 Pop	McIntire	Martin	D%	2010 Pop	Sonntag	McEntee	D%	2010 Pop	Ladenburg	McKenna	D%		
909,613	228,223	163,988	9.97%	909,613	274,874	113,696	69.413	906,211	331,661	69,413	13.38%	2010 Pop	Ladenburg	McKenna	9.86%		
982,567	117,126	260,656	15.85%	988,460	146,090	233,053	205,852	1,016,032	191,892	205,852	14.61%	982,567	110,792	267,821	15.85%		
13.53%	19.51%	9.97%	9.97%	13.53%	19.36%	8.36%	6.83%	13.48%	18.73%	6.83%	20.68%	13.38%	20.68%	9.86%	9.86%		
14.61%	9.97%	15.85%	15.85%	14.70%	10.29%	17.14%	20.25%	15.11%	10.82%	20.25%	14.61%	14.61%	9.62%	15.85%	15.85%		

Table 2

Most D to Most R Legislative Districts in Eleven Statewide Contests

	2010 Pop	Goldmark	Sutherland	D%	2010 Pop	Kreidler	Adams	D%	2010 Pop	Murray	Rossi	D%	
43	133,976	55,688	11,273	83.17	133,976	57,381	7,211	88.84	133,976	49,322	8,042	85.83	
37	127,546	40,336	9,397	81.11	127,546	42,674	6,158	87.39	127,546	37,108	6,280	85.53	
36	133,901	55,583	17,325	76.24	127,849	63,602	10,042	84.22	133,901	53,533	13,055	80.39	
46	127,848	49,193	16,142	75.29	133,901	59,494	11,219	84.13	127,849	48,404	12,016	80.11	
34	125,085	42,046	17,512	70.60	125,055	46,159	11,568	79.86	125,055	40,817	13,839	74.68	
11	134,027	25,830	14,683	60.35	134,027	29,493	10,469	73.80	134,027	22,924	11,115	67.39	
3	120,601	25,673	16,866	60.35	122,038	43,668	15,721	72.31	122,038	37,537	20,161	65.08	
32	122,038	37,235	24,543	60.27	141,893	47,798	19,048	71.50	123,857	25,831	15,282	62.81	
33	129,246	23,063	18,651	55.29	123,857	13,947	70.65	72.50	123,857	36,672	22,755	61.71	
40	138,825	36,080	29,321	55.17	127,259	24,326	11,107	68.65	29	127,259	16,571	10,903	60.32
21	133,156	30,308	24,649	55.15	129,246	27,860	13,268	67.74	33	129,246	20,980	14,903	58.47
48	134,778	27,087	22,649	54.68	133,156	36,422	17,674	67.33	21	133,156	28,221	20,490	57.94
38	129,624	28,987	21,094	54.63	129,624	30,072	15,623	65.81	40	138,925	34,351	25,577	57.32
27	123,857	26,500	22,025	54.61	138,925	41,780	21,735	65.78	3	120,601	19,428	15,028	56.39
28	127,259	18,857	16,366	54.57	142,722	41,006	21,611	65.48	38	129,624	21,845	16,968	56.28
48	130,423	17,091	24,342	52.67	130,423	32,511	17,487	65.02	48	130,423	26,841	21,224	55.84
41	147,285	32,984	30,876	52.23	120,601	26,516	14,923	63.98	41	142,722	34,803	27,860	55.81
23	130,119	32,937	30,897	51.60	147,265	39,398	22,966	63.79	23	130,119	31,233	25,811	54.75
45	136,432	31,870	31,235	50.56	129,988	27,820	16,512	62.75	33	130,119	31,075	25,889	54.45
22	141,685	34,042	33,827	50.46	126,904	30,341	18,288	62.34	49	134,778	22,950	19,219	54.42
30	129,988	22,375	22,558	49.80	132,679	41,040	25,078	62.07	45	136,432	31,465	28,437	62.83
6	141,123	33,447	36,389	47.89	130,119	36,821	23,958	61.84	24	132,679	33,023	29,882	52.49
42	146,619	31,795	34,899	47.67	136,432	37,573	23,634	61.34	28	136,432	21,200	19,932	51.54
44	156,488	32,236	35,574	47.54	119,494	28,192	18,660	61.00	19	126,904	23,230	22,308	51.01
47	140,148	24,821	27,448	47.49	136,142	37,245	24,484	60.33	47	140,148	23,568	23,778	48.78
5	161,403	33,872	37,776	47.35	140,146	30,589	20,606	59.75	42	146,619	29,819	31,578	48.57
19	126,904	24,216	27,036	47.25	156,489	39,793	26,821	59.73	35	161,403	33,355	35,412	48.50
24	132,679	32,125	36,272	46.97	161,403	40,633	28,979	58.37	35	138,142	27,816	29,535	48.50
17	150,727	26,443	30,100	46.77	146,619	37,307	28,082	57.05	44	156,489	29,382	31,742	48.02
10	134,117	30,859	35,883	46.24	134,117	37,307	28,082	57.05	10	134,117	29,327	27,381	46.26
18	132,788	17,828	21,103	45.93	133,755	34,962	26,574	56.82	25	145,035	23,547	21,342	46.13
3	143,154	27,652	33,513	45.39	145,035	32,598	24,878	56.72	26	133,755	26,035	30,468	46.13
4	141,254	27,277	33,958	43.14	143,154	33,723	26,116	56.36	39	143,154	24,616	29,851	45.19
28	119,494	21,017	27,769	43.08	137,685	30,391	24,510	55.36	6	141,123	28,951	34,844	45.01
26	133,755	26,878	35,934	42.79	150,727	28,989	27,824	53.92	31	137,685	22,024	28,070	43.97
35	138,142	26,980	36,084	42.78	163,707	36,566	31,710	53.86	2	163,707	23,333	30,834	43.08
25	145,035	24,908	33,877	42.59	163,707	32,472	28,697	52.86	15	132,788	14,003	19,032	42.39
31	137,685	23,770	32,456	42.28	132,788	20,213	18,154	52.68	40	141,029	23,366	34,778	40.19
8	136,186	21,238	29,396	41.94	160,083	33,638	35,114	48.93	18	160,083	25,475	38,162	40.03
18	160,083	29,125	41,306	41.35	130,478	20,721	22,131	48.35	13	143,750	14,215	30,533	31.77
2	163,707	25,658	36,687	41.15	141,254	29,788	32,008	48.20	8	136,186	16,872	27,824	37.75
12	132,531	21,355	31,525	40.50	136,186	23,175	25,741	47.38	16	154,830	17,042	29,276	36.79
7	130,475	23,632	34,804	40.44	132,531	23,821	27,011	46.88	12	132,531	17,865	30,707	36.78
14	130,478	16,669	26,406	38.70	154,830	22,112	27,074	44.96	14	130,478	13,613	23,858	36.33
13	143,750	17,518	31,108	36.18	149,474	24,884	31,876	43.85	8	149,474	19,438	34,359	36.13
16	154,830	18,124	32,058	36.12	143,750	20,815	26,693	43.61	7	130,475	18,186	35,427	33.93
20	141,029	24,686	40,489	35.91	130,475	24,147	31,481	43.41	13	143,750	14,215	30,533	31.77
8	149,474	19,224	39,734	33.17	6,724,540	1,679,696	1,056,693	61.38	6,724,540	1,314,930	1,196,164	52.36	
				50.55	6,724,540	1,679,696	1,056,693	61.38	6,724,540	1,314,930	1,196,164	52.36	
					2010 Pop	Kreidler	Adams		2010 Pop	Murray	Rossi		
					902,955	294,450	103,198		904,392	289,646	84,508		
					982,567	139,408	235,124		977,704	117,241	211,984		
					13.43%	20.78%	7.45%		13.45%	22.03%	7.06%		
					14.61%	9.84%	16.97%		14.54%	8.92%	17.72%		

Table 3

One More Republican District Required

Most Democratic	Descriptor	2010 Pop	Cum Pop	Enough Pop For ? Districts
37	28D+/-3	127,546	127,546	37 D D D
43	27D+/-5	133,976	261,522	43 D D D
36	22D+/-5	133,901	395,423	36 D D D
46	20D+/-6	127,849	523,272	46 D D D
34	17D+/-4	125,055	648,327	34 D D D
11	12D+/-2	134,027	782,354	11 D D D
32	10D+/-3	122,038	904,392	32 D D D
27	10D+/-3	123,857	1,028,249	27 D D D
29	9D+/-2	127,259	1,155,508	29 D D D
3	6D+/-4	120,601	1,276,109	3 D D D
22	5D+/-6	141,695	1,417,804	22 D D D
21	5D+/-2	133,156	1,550,960	21 D D D
33	5D+/-2	129,246	1,680,206	33 D D D
40	4D+/-1	138,925	1,819,131	40 D D D
38	4D+/-1	129,624	1,948,755	38 D D D
49	4D+/-3	134,779	2,083,534	49 D D D
19	2D+/-4	126,904	2,210,438	19 D D D
41	1D+/-4	142,722	2,353,160	41 R D D
1	1D+/-2	147,265	2,500,425	1 D D D
23	1D+/-1	130,119	2,630,544	23 D D D
30	1D+/-2	129,998	2,760,542	30 D D R
48	0+/-4	130,423	2,890,965	48 D D D
				21.066
24	0+/-2	132,679		24 D D D
45	1R+/-3	136,432		45 R D D
28	1R+/-3	119,494		28 R D D
35	3R+/-2	138,142		35 D D D
47	3R+/-2	140,146		47 R R D
44	3R+/-2	156,499	156,499	44 D D R
42	3R+/-2	146,619	303,118	42 R R R
5	4R+/-2	161,403	464,521	5 R R R
25	5R+/-2	145,035	609,556	25 D R R
39	5R+/-1	143,154	752,710	39 R R R
10	5R+/-1	134,117	886,827	10 D R R
26	5R+/-2	133,755	1,020,582	26 D R D
17	5R+/-3	150,727	1,171,309	17 R D R
15	5R+/-4	132,788	1,304,097	15 R R R
6	5R+/-3	141,123	1,445,220	6 R R R
20	9R+/-4	141,029	1,586,249	20 R R R
31	7R+/-2	137,685	1,723,934	31 R R D
2	7R+/-3	163,707	1,887,641	2 R R R
18	10R+/-3	160,083	2,047,724	18 R R R
4	11R+/-4	141,254	2,188,978	4 R R R
9	11R+/-4	136,166	2,325,144	9 R R R
14	12R+/-4	130,478	2,455,622	14 R R R
12	13R+/-3	132,531	2,588,153	12 R R R
16	14R+/-3	154,830	2,742,983	16 R R R
7	14R+/-4	130,475	2,873,458	7 R R R
13	16R+/-3	143,750	3,017,208	13 R R R
8	16R+/-2	149,474	3,166,682	8 R R R
				23.075
		6,724,540		
		137,236		

22 more-likely-to-vote-Democratic districts with population for 21 districts.
 22 more-likely-to-vote-Republican districts with population for 23 districts.

